Time for a brief foray outside the world of chess. (Those interested in chess alone can take a nap and wait for my next post.)
Intelligent Design Theory (IDT) has gained both fans and foes in the United States, and states, in brief, that it is possible to detect design in nature by employing a three-step filter. First, can some object or phenomenon be explained as the product of physical law? If so, then we stop: design cannot be inferred. If not, we proceed to step two: is it the product of chance? Again, a "yes" answer puts a stop to things, but a "no" allows us to conclude, or at least seriously consider, the possibility of design.
This so-called "design filter" is an idea of William Dembski's, and is well-illustrated by one of his
favorite examples. It turns out that in elections, the first name listed on a ballot receives more votes, all things being equal (pathetic, isn't it?), so name placement it supposed to be determined by random processes. Take, however, a case in which one party winds up with its candidates listed first 40 out of 41 times in a given election.
To evaluate whether this is a case of fraud by the election supervisor, let's use the design filter. Was the ordering of candidates the result of some lawlike process? Not according to the supervisor, who claimed to have followed the rules by using a randomizing process. Ok, we move on to chance. Is it reasonable to expect that this could have arisen by chance? It's not
impossible that it did, but as the odds against its happening were less than 1 in 50 billion, the best explanation was design: the supervisor engaged in fraud.
Dembski and IDT advocates wish to apply this to the biological realm. An organism's having certain features isn't the result of biological law, but of random genetic mutations. So it's not law, but, as the "random" part of "random genetic mutations" would suggest, a likely candidate for chance. But how much chance is acceptable? We must note that the degree of chance will be a function of the odds of a single event's occuring multiplied by the number of trials (our "luck resources"). (Thus the odds of flipping heads ten times in a row with a fair coin is 1 in 1024; pretty unlikely in a single trial, but overwhelmingly likely to happen many times over if hundreds of people are flipping coins all day.)
Determining how likely or unlikely an organism's having some feature really is will be a matter of great dispute and is the job for scientists and mathematicians. What can be said, according to Dembski, is that if it turns out that the probability of that feature's arising by chance, taking all the "luck resources" into account, is beyond some arbitrary but extremely small figure (1 in 10**150), then we can legitimately infer design.
Compare this with Young Earth Creationism (YEC), according to which the Earth is about 10,000 years old, "kinds" don't evolve into other kinds (i.e., while there is a great variety among, say, dog breeds, one will never get from a dog to a non-dog), geological strata aren't the product of billions of years but a worldwide Noahic flood, and human beings didn't evolve from non-human ancestors.
Both Intelligent Design Theorists and Young Earth Creationists believe that the biological realm is the product of a designer, and most advocates of these views are Christians. Further, like proponents of YEC, some of IDT's most prominent figures critique what they see as overoptimistic claims by the friends of (naturalistic) evolution. But does that make these two views "essentially" the same? One sometimes reads that IDT is "really" Creationism (by which the author has in mind YEC), but is this really so?
I don't think so.
I offer here several considerations to indicate that IDT and YEC are clearly conceptually independent - the differences are not merely cosmetic, but substantive.
First, IDT, as I understand it, does
not intrinsically reject evolution, taken as a descriptive hypothesis about the lineage of organisms on Earth. One could in principle accept the thesis of universal common descent and hold that there is good evidence for intelligent design - in fact, I believe that is Michael Behe's position (or at least was at the time of
Darwin's Black Box). That X can be designed by S even if Y is the proximate efficient cause of X is something regularly recognized in the case of human design (take, for example, the manufacture of cars and computer chips), and some, perhaps many, perhaps most ID theorists would say the same of the world's design. The young earth creationist, on the other hand, would not consider evolution as even a descriptive thesis, and that's a huge difference between the two.
Second, it seems to me that YEC is more closely tied to science in its proclamations than IDT. I don't mean by this that it is more accurate than IDT or that its scientific claims are acceptable - I'm not making any evaluative claims at all. Rather, my point is that YEC makes claims of a more empirically immediate sort than IDT: dinosaurs and humans co-existed, a worldwide flood explains geological strata, we can make inferences about mutation rates by examining the biological diversity that has occurred since the time of the Noahic flood, etc.
IDT, on the other hand, is something more like a philosophical hypothesis, or perhaps a meta-scientific framework. It's hard to cash IDT out in terms of concrete empirical predictions, and I'm not sure that it should. What it does claim is that design can be detected under certain conditions, and then looks to discover where those conditions have occurred.
Third, while YEC posits the God of the Bible as the designer, the IDT's designer (a) need not be the biblical God, (b) need not be omnipotent, omniscient, etc., (c) need not have created the universe, and (d) need not have any particular interest in humanity. (One might take Hume and Plato as examples of thinkers able to conceive of designers that, while immensely powerful and impressive, fell short of the God of traditional Western monotheism.)
Fourth, while the epistemic origins of YEC are religious (irrelevant though that is, if it can deliver the goods), there is nothing inherently religious about the design filter.
Fifth, the truth conditions for the two theories are different. (1) IDT could be true while YEC is false, and (2) YEC could be true while IDT is false. It's very easy to see how (1) could be the case, and (2) could occur at least two different ways. First, while it could be that the world has been designed (by the God of the Bible), Dembski's design filter might be a conceptually flawed way of detecting design. Second, YEC might be true, but its truth cannot be detected by Dembski's design filter (perhaps because the probability against a chance hypothesis doesn't quite reach the upper bound).
In short, the two are distinct in method, in how they interact with evolution (taken descriptively, divorced from a naturalistic metaphysics), in their predictions, in their empirical claims (and the lack thereof), in their religious implications and in their truth conditions.
They are simply not the same thing.
(N.B. for possible commentators: I am not endorsing (nor rejecting) either view in the above, but am arguing that the two cannot reasonably be equated. Second, I gently remind my readers to maintain appropriate decorum, regardless of their feelings towards either view,
lest you suffer the same fate of the recent Polgar hyperfan!)